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I
INTRODUCTION
The history of the international bond markets is one of constant innovation
and adaptation. One of the more-significant recent examples of this is the
development of an international Islamic “bond” market and the position of
sovereign borrowers at the forefront of that development of this market.
A. Islamic Bonds
Strictly speaking, Islamic bonds do not exist. The key aspects of Islamic
doctrine that define what is and is not permissible in the finance field help
explain why. Most people are familiar with the Islamic prohibition on the
charging of interest (or riba). This prohibition is one of four major prohibitions
that define the structuring of the Islamic equivalent of conventional bonds
(referred to as sukuk), the others being a prohibition on uncertainty (gharar), a
prohibition on gambling and speculation (maisir), and a prohibition on the use
of or dealing in certain banned commodities (such as alcohol or pork). In
contrast, Islamic doctrine encourages investors to share in the risks as well as in
the rewards associated with particular investment activities. In conventional
terms, equity-type investment is good (shares can go up as well as down)
whereas debt investment (guaranteed return subject to credit risk, which
Islamic doctrine does not regard as a real risk) is bad. Conventional bonds, of
course, are the latter.
B. A Brief History of International Sukuk
In December 2001, Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad, a Malaysian company,
completed the first international sukuk issue. This was a U.S.–dollar-
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denominated sukuk, targeted at investors in Asia and the Middle East. In July
2002, the Federation of Malaysia completed the second such issue. This was a
U.S.–dollar-denominated sukuk sold internationally, including in the United
States. This was also the first sukuk issue rated by international credit-rating
agencies.
Since these first two transactions, the international sukuk market has grown
significantly and has involved issuers located in Asia, the Middle East, and
elsewhere. Although the market is dominated by borrowers in Malaysia and the
Gulf Cooperation Council region (comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), international sukuk have also
been issued by borrowers located in Germany, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the
United States.
C. The Importance of Sovereign Borrowers
In many cases, one of the early issuers of international sukuk in a particular
country or territory has been a sovereign or quasi-sovereign borrower. Apart
from the Malaysian sovereign sukuk, this has been true of Bahrain, Qatar,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Ras Al Khaimah (one of the Emirates making up the
United Arab Emirates), Germany (where the issuer was the State of SaxonyAnhalt), and Saudi Arabia (where the issuer was the Islamic Development
Bank, a supranational located in the city of Jeddah).
A key driver of the sovereign involvement in many cases was the desire to
establish a benchmark and to encourage the development of a sukuk market in
the relevant country. Although less significant in countries where Islamic
principles are already a part of national law, a secondary factor behind
sovereign involvement was the need to facilitate the development of a legal
framework that would support sukuk issuance. Indeed, the U.K. government,
which has been considering a sukuk issue since mid-2007, has confirmed that
these reasons are key factors in its desire to access the sukuk market.
II
KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN SUKUK ISSUES
The innovation and adaptation that first enabled the issuance of Islamic
“bonds” and thereafter improved the structures initially used are particularly
notable in a number of specific sukuk issues. The Malaysian issue used
structuring that enabled an Islamic security to substantially replicate a
conventional debt security. Three other Islamic issues of note are the Bahrain
sukuk, the fourth sovereign sukuk (and fifth international sukuk), which
significantly refined the structure of international sukuk issues; the Pakistan
sukuk, which was one of the last international sukuk to use a true-sale structure;
and the Ras Al Khaimah sukuk, which was the first sovereign sukuk to be
issued under a sukuk-issuance program.
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A. The Malaysian Sukuk
In the Malaysian sukuk, the Federal Lands Commissioner of Malaysia (a
statutory entity set up to hold government land) sold beneficial title to certain
parcels of land to a newly formed Malaysian special-purpose company owned
by the government. The special-purpose company (the issuer) funded the
purchase price by issuing trust certificates (or sukuk) to international investors.
The Federal Lands Commissioner continued to hold the registered, legal title to
the land, but as bare trustee for the benefit of the issuer. This avoided the need
to register title and also avoided stamp and transfer duties.
Having issued the sukuk, the issuer and the government then entered into a
master ijara (or lease) contract (governed by Malaysian law) under which the
parties agreed to enter into successive semiannual leases of the land up to the
maturity date of the sukuk. Under each lease, the rent was set by reference to
the then-current, six-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)1 and was
paid by the government (as lessee) to the issuer (as lessor) at the end of the
relevant lease period. The government also entered into a unilateral purchase
undertaking, in which it undertook in favor of the issuer to repurchase the land
for the same price at which it was sold at the maturity date of the sukuk.
The conditions of the sukuk in turn provided that the holders were entitled
to receive periodic distributions on their sukuk in amounts and on dates
matching the rental payments due under the lease agreements.2 In addition, the
conditions of the sukuk provided that, at its maturity, the holders were entitled
to be repaid the amount invested by them. Essentially, therefore, the issuer
simply passed through to the holders of the sukuk on each periodic distribution
date the payments received by it from the government under the lease and, on
the maturity date, the payment received by it from the government under the
purchase undertaking. The conditions further provided that recourse against
the issuer be limited to the amounts actually received by the issuer from the
government, thereby making it clear that the credit risk the investors were
assuming was that of the government. The issuer was thus established in a
manner designed to make bankruptcy as remote as possible.
Unlike conventional debt securities, which record a debt owed by the issuer
to the investor, sukuk are trust certificates that record a trust declared by the
issuer over certain assets. Thus, sukuk are not debt instruments at all; instead,
they are designed to convey an ownership interest in one or more tangible
underlying assets. This is an important feature, for it is the ownership interest
conveyed by a sukuk that makes it a tradable instrument for Sharia purposes.3

1. Islamic scholars generally accept the use of interest-based reference rates on international
sukuk transactions.
2. Malaysia Global Sukuk, Inc. 22 (July 3, 2002) (prospectus, on file with Law & Contemporary
Problems).
3. Changing Sharia interpretations and the global financial crisis have affected the sukuk market
and sovereign issuance in particular. See infra Part III.
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As with a conventional debt security issued by Malaysia, a number of risks
inherent in the Malaysian sukuk required investor protection. A conventional,
unsecured sovereign debt security includes events of default in the conditions
(which provide the investors with an acceleration right in the event of
nonpayment or of certain other events) and may also include a negative pledge.
The Malaysian sukuk included similar provisions, although many of these
provisions could be found in the lease agreement rather than in the conditions
of the sukuk (reflecting that the sukuk were issued by a special-purpose
vehicle). To ensure that the issuer would have recourse to funds if an event of
default occurred, the purchase undertaking by the government included a
promise to buy the land back following an event of default at the original sale
price.
Other risk concerns that were identified as being specific to the Malaysian
sukuk (as opposed to a conventional debt security issued by Malaysia) included
the following:
1. Who bears the maintenance costs for the land (in particular any
buildings or equipment on the land)? Under Sharia principles, the
lessee is responsible for the day-to-day (or ordinary) maintenance of
the assets being leased while the lessor is responsible for all other
maintenance and repair (major maintenance). Reflecting that the
lessor was a special-purpose company and therefore not in a position
to undertake major maintenance, the issuer and the government
entered into a service-agency agreement under which the government,
acting as the issuer’s agent, agreed to perform any major maintenance
necessary against reimbursement by the issuer at maturity.
Recognizing that this could involve the issuer’s expending funds which
it would not have, the purchase price of the land at maturity was
amended to comprise the original price paid plus any amount owed by
the issuer for major maintenance, with the two maintenance amounts
being set off against each other.
2. What happens if the property is destroyed? Under Sharia principles,
a lessee cannot be required to pay rental for a property that has been
destroyed because that would place an important incidence of
ownership on the lessee (rather than on the owner). Thus the leases in
the Malaysian sukuk provided that they would terminate on a totalloss event occurring in relation to the land. Total-loss events include
expropriation or destruction beyond economic repair of the land. This
would mean, however, that if a total-loss event occurred, investors
would suffer not only the loss of the periodic distribution amounts due
after the date of the loss but would also not receive the return of their
principal, for there would be no asset to sell at maturity. This is a risk
they were not prepared to take, so the service-agency agreement
imposed an obligation on the government (as agent of the issuer) to
insure against a total loss, with the costs of that insurance to be

WEDDBERBURN-DAY

Fall 2010]

1/16/2011

SOVEREIGN SUKUK: ADAPTATION AND INNOVATION

329

reimbursed by the issuer (in the same manner that the costs of major
maintenance are reimbursed). Accordingly, in the event that a totalloss event occurred, investors would have rights to the insurance
monies payable for that loss.
3. What happens to the land on a default? Under the Malaysian sukuk
structure, the issuer is the beneficial owner of the land. The trust
certificates issued by the issuer represent an undivided beneficial
ownership interest in the trust assets (being the issuer’s rights to the
land as well as its rights respecting the underlying contractual
documentation such as the leases and the purchase undertaking).
Given this ownership structure, an investor might reasonably conclude
that on a default by the government, he would have recourse to the
land and could sell it to fund repayment of his sukuk. The conditions
of the sukuk, however, specifically provide that under no
circumstances shall the issuer or any investor have the right to sell the
land other than to the government in accordance with the purchase
undertaking. This limited-recourse provision reflects the commercial
intention (seeking to replicate in a Sharia-compliant manner, and as
far as possible, an unsecured conventional debt security). As a result
of this provision, should the government default, the only rights the
investors would have respecting that default would be to sue the
government for failure to perform its obligation under the purchase
undertaking to buy the land back on an event of default occurring.
This right is the equivalent of the right of an investor in a conventional
debt instrument to sue for unpaid principal.
B. The Bahrain Sukuk
In the Bahrain sukuk, the original intention was to have a similar sale and
leaseback structure as Malaysia did. For various Bahrain-specific reasons,
though, it was not possible for the government to sell the land, so a head-lease–
sublease structure was devised. The head-lease–sublease allowed the Bahraini
government to lease certain vacant land located at Bahrain’s airport to the
issuer, a special-purpose Bahraini company established by the central bank for
the purposes of the transaction, for a term of 100 years.4 A single, advance
rental payment was made by the issuer for this lease and funded by the issuer
issuing the sukuk. The issuer then sublet the land back to the Bahraini
Government for the term of the sukuk. At maturity, a termination payment was
made by the Bahraini Government to the issuer for the head lease, and this
payment funded the redemption of the sukuk by the issuer.
One other area in which the Bahrain sukuk was innovative involved the
position on enforcement. In a conventional debt security for which a trustee is
4. BMA International Sukuk Company 20 (June 30, 2004) (prospectus, on file with Law &
Contemporary Problems).
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appointed, the duties of the trustee are minimal, so long as the issuer is
performing its obligations. However, should the issuer default, the trustee
assumes significant responsibilities in terms of enforcement against the issuer.
One issue that concerned the managers and investors in the Bahrain sukuk was
that, as a government-owned company, the issuer would be susceptible to
direction by the government and might not therefore take the necessary action
to enforce against the government in the event of a default. In addition, as a
special-purpose company, the issuer (even if it wanted to) might not have the
ability to take enforcement action either through lack of funds or through lack
of personnel.
This issue had also been considered on the Malaysia sukuk; the solution
there was for the issuer to appoint an independent third party to act as a
cotrustee with the same rights and obligations as the issuer in its capacity as
trustee. In the event of any disagreement or conflict between the two trustees,
the views of the cotrustee would prevail.
In the Bahrain sukuk, a slightly different solution was adopted: the issuer (in
its capacity as trustee) at the outset of the transaction delegated its rights and
obligations as trustee to an independent trust company contingent on a default
occurring. The effect of the provision was that if a default did occur, the issuer
would cease to have any duties as trustee, and these duties would pass to the
independent trust company, putting the sukuk holders in much the same
position as holders of conventional debt securities for which a trustee is
appointed. This delegation feature is now standard on almost all international
sukuk.
C. The Pakistan Sukuk
Like the Malaysia sukuk, the Pakistan sukuk involved a sale and leaseback
structure. An interesting feature of the Pakistan sukuk (and of the Bahrain
sukuk before it) was that the sukuk assets were sold in a true sale (where legal
title to the assets concerned passed to the issuer) as opposed to the kind of
beneficial ownership distinguishing the Malaysian sukuk. The asset was a part
of a motorway. Because the sections of the motorway being sold ran through a
large number of different administrative districts, the transaction involved the
registration of the sale of approximately 125 separate land parcels in nine
separate administrative districts. All parcels were required to be registered at
closing, involving a significant administrative burden. This appears to have been
one of the last of the true-sale, unsecured sukuk transactions, with subsequent
issues reverting to the Malaysian formula and typically conveying only a
beneficial, unregistered ownership interest in the underlying assets.
D. The Ras Al Khaimah Sukuk
Like Pakistan’s, the Ras Al Khaimah sukuk involved the sale and leaseback
of a road owned by the government. Unlike the previous sovereign sukuk
transactions, though, the issuer in the Ras Al Khaimah sukuk was a Cayman
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Islands–incorporated, orphan special-purpose company rather than a locally
incorporated, government-controlled company.5 This reflected the position
adopted by a number of influential Islamic scholars that there should be no
ownership relationship between the issuer and the underlying obligor absent a
good reason an independent entity could not be established.
As there was no such good reason regarding the Ras Al Khaimah
transaction, the parties agreed that a Cayman Islands orphan company would
be used. But during the process of the transaction, the Ras Al Khaimah
government became concerned that it might lose control over its assets, given
its lack of control over the issuer. The parties debated a number of possible
solutions, including, among others, amending the articles of association of the
issuer, giving additional contractual comfort to the government, and relying on
the reputation and good faith of the issuer–administrator and its directors.
Ultimately, specific additional contractual provisions were included, which gave
sufficient comfort to the government to enable it to proceed with the
transaction.
The Ras Al Khaimah sukuk was issued under a sukuk program, the first
such program to be established by a sovereign. Subsequently, the government
of Dubai has also established a sukuk program.
III
THE IMPACT OF THE 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SOVEREIGN SUKUK
ISSUANCE
Since late 2007, the sukuk market has been adversely affected by two
separate factors—a change in the position of most major Islamic scholars on the
acceptable types of structure6 and the impact of the global financial crisis that
started towards the end of 2007. An International Monetary Fund paper
published in July 2008 showed total sukuk issuance in the years 2004 to 2007
growing from approximately $7.2 billion7 in 2004 to $12.0 billion in 2005, $27.4
billion in 2006, and $38.6 billion in 2007.8 At the end of 2007, outstanding sukuk
globally exceeded $90 billion. The paper suggested that, based on current
trends, the total amount of issued sukuk was likely to exceed $200 billion by the
end of 2010.9
In September 2009, Standard and Poor’s published a report showing that
sukuk issuance in 2008 was approximately only $15 billion, reflecting both the

5. RAK Capital 51–52 (May 2, 2008) (prospectus, on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).
6. In March 2008, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
(AAOIFI) published new guidance on the permitted structures for sukuk, which significantly restricted
the future use of previously available structures. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SHARI’AH BOARD RESOLUTIONS ON SUKUK 2–3 (2008).
7. All references to currency are in U.S. dollars.
8. Andreas Jobst et al., Islamic Bond Issuance—What Sovereign Debt Managers Need to Know,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (July 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm.
9. Id.
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adverse effects of the scholars’ acceptance of the sukuk and the 2008 financial
crisis.10 The same report noted that issuance in the first seven months of 2009
was approximately $9.3 billion compared to $11.1 billion in the same period of
2008, suggesting a continued slowdown in 2009. But in November 2009,
Moody’s issued a report noting that global sukuk issuance had surged by forty
percent in the first ten months of 2009 compared with the corresponding period
of 2008,11 reflecting both continued recovery in the later part of 2009 and the
significant slowdown experienced at the end of 2008. The Moody’s report noted
that “sovereigns and government-related issuers (GRIs) have now become the
most common sukuk issuers as they face a need to launch a variety of funding
programmes amid declining economic activity, fiscal deficits and lower
commodity prices.”12
Although the changing views of Islamic scholars, formalized and published
in March 2008,13 significantly reduced the number of structures acceptable for
use in sukuk and therefore contributed to the fall in sukuk issuance in 2008, this
guidance did not significantly adversely affect sovereign issuance. The reason
was that the guidance did not affect the use of the ijara (sale and leaseback)
structure, and it is this structure that has been most used by sovereign issuers of
sukuk.
One notable significant effect of the global financial crisis on sovereign
sukuk issuance was the delay in issuance by the U.K. government of its debut
sukuk. The U.K. government conducted public consultations in May and
November 2007 on its plans to issue a sukuk. A number of responses were
received to both consultations and, in June 2008, the government published its
response.14 In the response, the then-Economic Secretary to the Treasury
confirmed that the government was committed to continuing support of the
long-term development of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom. The
response stated that the government favored establishing a program for the
issuance of short-term sukuk instruments using an ijara-based structure. But the
government recognized that a number of issues relating to the structuring,
regulation, and taxation of sukuk remained, which it intended to continue to
address.
In the autumn of 2008 and reflecting the effects of the global financial crisis,
the U.K. government announced that its plans to issue sukuk had been placed
on hold. But the government has continued to work on resolving the obstacles

10. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Sukuk Market Has Continued to Progress in 2009, Despite
Some Roadblocks (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).
11. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Sukuk Issuance Surges, Dominated by GovernmentRelated Issuers (Nov. 10, 2009) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems).
12. Id.
13. See ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 6.
14. DEBT MANAGEMENT OFFICE OF HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, GOVERNMENT STERLING
SUKUK ISSUANCE: A RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION X (June 2008).
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identified in the response and most recently has enacted legislation15 designed to
address the unequal regulatory treatment in the United Kingdom of sukuk and
conventional bonds.
It is likely that, as markets around the world emerge from the global
economic downturn experienced since late 2007, activity in the sukuk market
will increase and adaptation and innovation in the market will continue. One
anticipated trend in particular is the use of the market by non-Islamic
borrowers based in non-Islamic countries. The governments of a number of
European and Asian non-Muslim countries have expressed interest in the
possibility of sukuk issuance and a recent high profile example of a sukuk from
a non-Muslim international borrower was the issue by GE Capital Sukuk Ltd.
in November 2009 of a $500 million sukuk.

15. The Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.), amended by (Regulated Activities)
(Amendment) Order 2010 No. 905.

